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ABSTRACT 
This article investigates the role of the EU in conflict resolution, taking 
Cyprus as a case of an 'internalised' conflict, whereby a side of the 
dispute has become a member state (Greek-Cypriots), while the rest of 
actors (Turkey, Turkish Cypriots) remain outside but are still developing 
relations to the EU. In exploring the impact of the EU on Greek Cypriot, 
Turkish Cypriot and Turkish policies towards the dispute, this work 
engages with the Europeanisation debate. The argument advanced is 
that internalisation of the conflict limits the ability of the EU to act in the 
dispute and triggers inflexible policies, which are counterproductive to 
resolution. This work contributes to the Europeanisation discussion and 
the impact of the EU on domestic policies, especially in conflict 
situations. With a series of conflicts in the European periphery but also 
disputes within the EU (e.g. separatists tensions), this is an important 
contribution to the understudied topic of 'internalised conflicts'. 
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Europeanisation and 'Internalised' Conflicts: 
The Case of Cyprus 
 
1. Introduction 
This article seeks to investigate the role of the European Union (EU) in 
conflict resolution, taking Cyprus as a study case of an 'internalised' 
conflict, whereby a side of the conflict became a member state during 
the dispute (Greek Cypriots), while the rest of actors (Turkey, Turkish 
Cypriots) remain outside but still developing their relations to the EU. In 
exploring the role of the EU in internalised conflicts, this work engages 
with the debate on Europeanisation, which contemplates the impact of 
the EU on its partners. Discussing the example of Cyprus, research draws 
extensively on how conditionality impacts the domestic scene and 
policies of the sides of the dispute.  
The accession of Cyprus into the EU failed to become a catalyst for the 
resolution of the conflict. Just before the country's EU accession and 
after years of inflexibility, Turkey supported then UN-proposed 'Annan 
Plan' for the reunification of the island. This was a strategy that aimed at 
advancing Turkey's own EU accession, which was conditioned on the 
resolution of the Cyprus dispute. Similarly, Turkish Cypriots approved 
reunification, as the only way to join the EU as partners of a new, federal 
Cyprus. But Greek Cypriots, whose accession as the Republic of Cyprus 
(RoC) was not conditioned on the resolution of the dispute, rejected 
reunification and Cyprus entered the EU still a divided island. These 
developments raise a crucial question: how does furthering relations to 
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the EU for one side of the conflict, such as in the case of EU accession of 
the Greek Cypriots, impact the dynamics of the dispute and the chances 
for its resolution?  
The paper advances the argument that EU internalisation of the conflict 
is counterproductive to resolution and, instead, causes more friction 
between the sides of the dispute. Based on the example of Cyprus, the 
internalisation of the conflict is suggested to offer one side of the 
dispute the chance to use EU decision making to promote their policy 
preferences. In turn, this leads to friction with those sides of the conflict 
that are outside the EU, whose relations to 'Brussels' also deteriorate 
and cause less compromising policies in the dispute. In this regard, the 
EU internalisation of the conflict does not push towards resolution but it 
does impact the dynamics of the dispute in a unique way. In 
investigating this process, this paper begins with a discussion of 
Europeanisation and conflict resolution before the investigation of the 
example of Cyprus in the main body. The paper draws on qualitative 
analysis of policy documents and discourse and a series of interviews 
with local and EU elites.  
Along these lines, this work contributes to the discussion on 
Europeanisation and the aptitude of the EU to impact domestic matters 
and policies, especially in conflict situations. This is indeed a 
continuously important issue in European affairs because of the EU's 
engagement in a series of conflict-ridden regions, including the Balkans, 
Caucasus or the Middle East. In addition, separatist tensions within 
existing member states (like Spain or Belgium) also raise a series of 
questions on 'internal' disputes and the role that the EU plays in this 
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context. On the side, this paper offers an empirical investigation of post-
accession years in Cyprus and the new dynamics of the conflict, which 
remain comparatively neglected in a literature that has focused more on 
the pre-accession period in the island. 
2.  Europeanisation and Regional Conflicts: Inside and Outside 
of the European Union  
What is Europeanisation is still at the centre of a heated academic 
debate. Yet, a good part of the Europeanisation literature has reflected 
on the process through which the EU impacts domestic dynamics of its 
partners. Ladrech (2010, 2) summarises different conceptualisations and 
approaches Europeanisation of EU member states as a change 'whose 
motivating logic is tied to EU policy or decision-making process'. As a 
result, Europeanisation studies have looked at how the EU impacts 
domestic politics, policy and polity (Ladrech 1994; Börzel 1999; Wallace 
2000; Hix and Goetz 2001; Buller and Gamble 2002; Töller 2010). This 
work seeks to investigate EU-induced changes in Greek Cypriot, Turkish 
and Turkish Cypriot policies towards the Cyprus conflict. 
But each side of the Cyprus conflict relates to the EU in different ways: 
the Greek Cypriot-led RoC started as a candidate for EU membership but 
is now a full EU member state. On the other hand, Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriots are outsiders but still developing their relation to the 
EU: Turkey is a candidate for EU accession. Turkish Cypriots can also be 
seen as an 'acceding' part:  at the moment, their territorial and 
administrative separation from the RoC means that, although the entire 
island is an EU territory, EU law does not apply in the self-declared 
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Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Yet, EU's endeavour in 
north Cyprus resembles a lot the practise of enlargement because it 
focuses on the assistance of a third party (Turkish Cypriots) towards 
development and alignment to EU law, before entry into the EU in the 
event of a reunification and replacement of the RoC by a new federation 
of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. These fundamental differences 
between Greek Cypriots and Turkey/ Turkish Cypriots can be expected to 
mediate the process of Europeanisation in each instance and how the 
impact of EU integration is investigated.  
In cases of enlargement, such as Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots, the 
Europeanisation debate has focused on the comparative domination of 
the EU in setting the terms of entry into the EU during the process of 
accession. Candidate countries, though free to decide how to respond to 
the terms of accession, lack any power in affecting EU decision-making 
or the content of accession conditionality, which becomes the channel of 
their 'Europeanisation'. In this regard, the literature has elaborated on 
the reward of accession (Sedelmeier 2011) and how it provides external 
incentives for change (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir 2004) and has 
suggested that Europeanisation pressures gain where a) candidates are 
certain that addressing conditionality will result in a certain reward (the 
ultimate reward being EU accession) and where b) 'Brussels' are 
adamant in their threat that failure to meet conditionality equals 
suspension of this prize. Besides, the degree of change is also 
conceptualised as depending on the associated costs for political elites 
(Schimmelfennig and Seldemeier 2004). In this context, the credibility of 
the reward is also very important for the public support of European 
integration, which has provided national governments with additional 
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room for reforms towards EU accession (Agh 1999: 841; Lippert et al. 
2001: 1001-1002).  
In this sense, EU conditionality has been viewed as a particular motive 
for change of policies towards conflicts in specific1. Due to the relative 
lack of cooperation amongst EU member states in external affairs, 
conflict-related conditionality is often case-specific and refers to 
instances where there is an on-going dispute between states that relate 
to the EU in different ways (EU members, candidates or third states)2. 
While conditionality can be challenging to work in cases that maintain 
relatively loose relations to the EU beyond enlargement framework (e.g. 
European Neighbourhood Policy- see Whitman and Wolff 2010: 16), EU-
provided rewards seem to increase the effectiveness of conditionality in 
candidates for EU membership. Indeed, there exist many works on the 
role of prizes that EU can offer, like accession, in incentivising change of 
policies towards conflict resolution (e.g. Noucheva 2004; Tocci 2007: 13), 
some of which concentrate on the example of Cyprus during its early 
accession period (e.g. Christou 2004; Tocci 2004).  
But the recently acquired EU membership makes Greek Cypriots a rather 
different actor in the conflict. For once, the entry into the EU is 
synonymous to the expiration of any EU-inflicted conditionality, since 
the balance of power in favour of the EU dramatically changes. At the 
same time, the literature has focused on the avenues that membership 
                                                 
1
 The EU has also attempted mediation (e.g. Nouchenva et al. 2004) or change the general 
environment of the conflict and facilitate resolution (e.g. Whitman and Wolff 2010), rather than 
explicitly ask for a change of policies.  
2
 Beyond Cyprus and Turkey, other prominent examples include: Greece and Former Yugoslavic 
Republc of Macedonia; Serbia and Kosovo; Estonia and Croatia.  
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opens for states to ‘upload’ their policy preferences at the EU level (e.g. 
Börzel and Risse 2002, Dyson and Goetz 2003). In this context, the EU 
accession pending resolution of the dispute makes Cyprus a case that is 
different to other prominent examples, where conditionality relates to a 
conflict that arose between an already existing member state and a 
candidate (e.g. Greece and F.Y.R.O.M. or Slovenia and Croatia) or 
between two candidates, which both have to overcome the 'barrier' of 
the conflict before advancing their EU prospects (e.g. Serbia and 
Kosovo). It is indeed this 'internalisation' of the conflict, where one side 
of the conflict is a member state while the rest of actors are outside but 
still developing their relations to the EU, that makes Cyprus a particularly 
interesting example of Europeanisation.  This is not to suggest that 
disputes between EU and non EU member states is a new phenomenon. 
Yet, what makes Cyprus case different is that the accession of one side 
of the dispute (RoC) took place during the conflict and while the rest of 
actors (Turkey, Turkish Cypriots) were left outside, in compare to cases 
where conflict is between an already EU member state and a candidate 
or between two candidates. 
This accession of one side of the dispute in the EU raises a series of new 
questions: how do new EU members try to influence EU policy towards 
the conflict? and how does the accession of one side of the dispute 
(here, Greek Cypriots) impacts the ability of the EU to trigger changes in 
the policies of the other sides of the conflict (Turkey, Turkish Cypriots)? 
In answering those questions, analysis focuses on the how different 
forms of relationship to 'Brussels' (i.e. EU membership, candidacy for EU 
membership) shape the Europeanisation of policies and the conflict in 
reference to three mediating factors: 
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 1) clarity of rewards 
Firstly, the internalisation of the conflict is expected to reduce the 
credibility of conditionality for the part(s) of the conflict that join the EU, 
which, having captured the ultimate 'reward' of accession, remain with 
no EU-induced incentives to change policy towards the dispute. For 
those outside the EU, their friction with the side(s) of the conflict within 
the EU is counter-productive to their overall relations to 'Brussels' and, 
therefore, the clarity of rewards, like full integration into the EU, which 
becomes a less realistic scenario.  
 2) clarity of threats 
As with rewards, the EU no longer holds any credible threats to 
incentivise parts of the conflict that are member states towards a certain 
policy on the dispute. In contrast, the clarity of threats is now higher for 
those outside the EU: the access of opposing side(s) of the conflict to EU 
decision-making mechanisms means that the EU is unlikely to show 
flexibility and offer rewards without compliance with conditionality, 
especially in relation to the conflict. 
 3) legitimacy of the EU  
Legitimacy of the EU has been discussed before as a factor that affects 
conditionality (see also Sedelmeier 2011). So far mostly discussed in 
sociological and constructivist terms (Sedelmeier 2011, 13), this paper 
takes a more 'rational' road and reflects on a) how less public legitimacy 
of the EU limits the government's ability to comply with EU 
conditionality and b) how national elites instrumentally reflect on the 
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EU's limited legitimacy to justify less compliance with conditionality and, 
therefore, inflexible positions in the conflict.  
In this context, the argument advanced in this paper is that the 
'internalisation' of the conflict into the EU reduces the credibility of 
conditionality because a) the acceding part remains with no motives to 
change policy towards the dispute and b) part(s) outside the EU 
experience a slow-down in their relations to 'Brussels', which offers less 
incentives to meet conditionality. In addition, the paper introduces 
legitimacy of the EU as yet another mediating factor of the 
Europeanisation of policies towards the conflict: for the parts outside 
the EU, the accession of one side of the conflict means that they can 
develop a rhetoric that paints the EU as a rather illegitimate actor in the 
dispute and by that justify less compliance with conditionality and 
compromised positions and, instead, maximise gains in the context of 
the conflict. Besides, the less public support of the EU means less space 
for meeting conditionality criteria, especially in sensitive issues, like 
conflict resolution. As a result and contra conditionality, this paper 
suggests that the internalisation of the conflict causes renewed tensions 
in the dispute and limit the ability of the EU to promote conflict 
resolution.  
3. Greek Cypriots: The State Within 
The EU Enlargement of Cyprus during the nineties was seen by many as 
an opportunity to resolve the island's dispute before accession. For that 
reason, the UN embarked in yet another mediation effort, which 
cultivated in the so-called 'Annan Plan', a proposal for the establishment 
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of the 'United Cyprus Republic', a loose federation of Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots that could accede to the EU. While the EU played an 
important role in influencing the policies of the three different sides of 
the conflict, it was not always towards resolution: On the one hand, the 
government of Turkey supported the UN-proposed plan and the same 
did the Turkish Cypriot pro-solution leadership, which was elected by the 
community in north Cyprus, who also voted 'yes' in the referendum on 
the Annan Plan. Yet, the Greek Cypriot leadership did not support 
reunification and Greek Cypriot people followed and rejected the UN 
blueprint, a few days before accession.  
Interestingly, the EU gave Greek Cypriots motives to actually reject 
reunification: since the very early stages of the accession process, Greek 
Cypriots thought that entering the EU under the RoC and not as a 
reunited country (according to the UN plan) will increase their 
diplomatic position in the dispute and vis a vis both Turkish Cypriots and 
Turkey (see also Nugent 2003, 10). After rejecting the Annan Plan and 
joining the EU alone, Greek Cypriots have indeed tried to 'upload' their 
policy preferences at the EU level and secure concessions from the 
candidate Turkey. For example, shortly after gaining EU member status, 
the RoC listed a series of demands for Ankara to address before Turkey's 
accession negotiations begin. This agenda did not win the full support of 
EU partners (see also Faustmann 2011) and, eventually, the RoC had to 
abandon the list. Nevertheless, the opening of Turkey's accession 
negotiations was conditioned on the ratification of the Additional 
Protocol (Turkey's custom union with all EU member states, Council of 
the EU 2006). The Turkish government signed the protocol but declared 
that ratification did not imply recognition of the RoC or opening of 
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Turkish ports to it. For that reason, although Turkey’s accession 
negotiations commenced, full implementation of the protocol is still part 
of conditionality. Indeed, the RoC continues to be immovable about the 
need to implement the protocol and its officials often cite this issue as 
an example of how Turkish intransigence damages the country's own 
accession prospects (interview with Greek Cypriot diplomat 2013).  
But the internalisation of the conflict means that Greek Cypriots have 
been able to take advantage of their EU membership in a series of other 
diplomatic fronts that relate to Turkey, beyond its strictly speaking 
accession process. For example, the RoC tried to veto Ankara’s 
involvement in EU-Syria talks over the crisis in the Middle-East country 
(Today’s Zaman, 30 November 2011) or to limit Turkish opposition to 
Greek Cypriot attempts for gas exploitation (Reuters, 14 September 
2011). These diplomatic efforts did not bring fruits and instead increased 
the friction with Turkey, which unilaterally moved to exploratory oil drills 
in north Cyprus (BBC News, 26 April 2012). All these developments have 
naturally increased the hostility between the sides of the dispute.  
Most importantly, renewed friction has been caused by the Greek 
Cypriot opposition to the EU's engagement in north Cyprus. When in 
April 2004 the Turkish Cypriots approved the Annan Plan for 
reunification but remained outside the EU due to the Greek Cypriot 
rejection, the EU sought to reward the community’s stance and 
proposed measures to 'end [its] isolation and encourag[e its] economic 
development' (General Affairs Council, 2004).  Few days before Cyprus 
accession in May 2004, the EU approved the Green Line Regulation 
(Council of the EU 2004), which controls movement of goods and 
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persons through the border that separates the two communities and 
also aims to support the Turkish Cypriot economy through trade with the 
Greek Cypriots. In the aftermath of the aborted reunification, the 
European Commission proposed two additional regulations that hoped 
to address the peculiar accession and help Turkish Cypriots: the Direct 
Trade Regulation (European Commission 2004), a trade agreement 
between the EU and the community, and the Financial Aid Regulation 
(Council of the EU 2006b), which aims at development and preparation 
for implementation of the EU law in north Cyprus in the event of a 
reunification. After many tribulations, coming especially from Greek 
Cypriot objections, the Financial Aid Regulation was adopted in 2006 but 
its effective implementation is seriously compromised by the unique 
political and economic situation in the island3. Most crucially, the Direct 
Trade Regulation was never materialised, mostly because Greek Cypriots 
block it, based on the rationale that implementation would amount to 
the recognition of the self-declared Turkish Cypriot state.  
In this regard, Greek Cypriots remain with no EU-informed rewards or 
threats to change policy towards the conflict. But this is not to suggest 
the absence of an EU impact. In contrast, the decision to welcome the 
RoC into the EU has allowed Greek Cypriots to deploy their EU 
membership vis a vis both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots and this is 
indicative of how they view the EU as an avenue through which they can 
promote their preferences in the context of the conflict. Indeed, the 
actual EU accession while the conflict is still ongoing seems to have 
added to the Greek Cypriot rationalisation of the EU as a strategic tool 
                                                 
3
 The European Commission underlines the problems posed by the unique political and economic 
context in north Cyprus, such as the lack of a recognised beneficiary because of the non-recognition 
of Turkish Cypriot authorities (European Commission 2012, 10)  
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via which they can advance their interests in the dispute- this represents 
an important difference to how old EU member states might utilise their 
membership in the context of a conflict. Along these lines, it is important 
to distinguish between EU-induced changes in general and change 
towards meeting conditionality in specific: relations to the EU can be 
conceptualised as carrying a significant impact on domestic policies, but 
not always towards meeting conditionality. 
4. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots: The End of Credible 
Conditionality?  
 Of all the factors that shape Turkish policy towards the Cyprus issue, the 
EU represents perhaps the most interesting one. The recognition of the 
country as a candidate for membership in 1999 signalled the beginning 
of a strong EU impact on Turkish policies towards the Cyprus issue: in 
order to win the reward of membership, Turkey was asked by the EU to 
normalise relations with the RoC and this made the resolution of the 
Cyprus dispute a condition of its accession. Following from this, an EU-
induced transformation of Turkish policy took place and soon Ankara 
openly supported reunification based on the Annan Plan. Compliance 
with EU conditionality on the Cyprus issue was also helped by the new, 
pro-EU Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi –AKP) 
government in 2002 and the extensive public support of European 
integration at that time (European Commission 2004b). The strategic 
preference to stop a Greek Cypriot-only state to enter the EU (Suvarierol 
2003: 66) but also growing Turkish Cypriot pro-solution/EU attitudes 
(see also later) also played a role. This EU impact on Turkey was a stark 
contrast to the previous and long-standing Turkish inflexibility towards 
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reunification (see also Kazan 2002). In more recent years however, and 
also as a result of the internalisation of the Cyprus dispute, the 
Europeanisation of Turkish policy has taken a rather different turn.  
Post-2004 Turkish rhetoric on Cyprus emphasises the limited legitimacy 
of the EU, because of the presence of Greek Cypriots through the RoC. 
Indeed, attacks on the EU's legitimacy also draw on the fact that the EU 
allowed the accession of the RoC, regardless of the Greek Cypriot 
rejection of reunification (unlike Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, where 
European integration had always been linked to the resolution of the 
dispute). For example, Turkish officials underline the impartially of the 
EU in the Cyprus issue (interview with Turkish diplomat 2013), while 
others (interview with Turkish official 2013) suggests that the accession 
of the RoC was a major mistake of the EU, which undermined Turkish 
trust, and that EU membership of Greek Cypriots is the most important 
challenge in finding a solution to the Cyprus issue.   
What is more, the Greek Cypriot efforts to promote their interests via EU 
decision-making has pushed Turkey towards less flexibility in the dispute 
and compliance with EU conditionality. For example, the Greek Cypriot 
opposition to the EU assistance of the Turkish Cypriots has displeased 
both north Nicosia (interview with Turkish Cypriot official 2009, 
interview with Turkish Cypriot official 2009) and the 'motherland' 
Turkey, which has linked the fulfilment of its conditionality and the 
implementation of the Additional Protocol to the approval of EU trade 
with the Turkish Cypriots (BBC News, 13 September 2006). In addition, 
Turkish political rhetoric increasingly draws on the self-determination of 
the Turkish Cypriots, which contradict the agreed parameters of a 
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solution based on a federation. In this context, a statement of the 
Turkish Foreign ministry is indicative:  
Turkish Cypriots, as a people who organized themselves under their 
constitutional order within their territorial boundaries, exercise 
governmental authority, jurisdiction and sovereignty. Turkey's 
recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will remain 
unchanged (Anatolia, 1 May 2005). 
This internalisation of the conflict has naturally led to the slow-down of 
the European integration of Turkey, as a party of the dispute that stays 
outside the EU. The awaiting resolution has created a hermetic barrier in 
Turkey’s road to membership, most vividly depicted in the pending 
implementation of the Additional Protocol and the freeze of a number of 
negotiation chapters. True, the accession of the RoC into the EU has 
increased the clarity of the threat of suspending Turkey's accession: it is 
now very clear that, in absence of a compromising position towards the 
dispute, Turkey will not be allowed into the EU. At the same time, the 
clarity of the reward has been seriously undermined by an accession 
process that has deteriorated, also because of the internalisation of the 
conflict and the many blockages that Greek Cypriots create. Last but not 
least, the legitimacy of the EU has been attacked by Turkey,  which 
reflects on the EU as nothing but a neutral actor in the dispute. In the 
words of senior Turkish official (interview 2013) 'the EU’s leverage in 
Turkey’s political reform process and its credibility have been weakened 
as a result of increasing politicisation of the negotiations'. 
As for the Turkish Cypriots, the EU has also impacted their policies 
towards the Cyprus issue in recent times. Especially in the years leading 
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up to the EU accession of the island, north Cyprus experienced a 
sweeping public trend in favour of the EU and reunification based on the 
Annan Plan (Kyris 2013). This was also because European integration 
(through reunification) was regarded as the exit from the international 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and, essentially, a series of economic, 
social and political benefits. In the end, the EU motivated Turkish 
Cypriots to elect new, pro-solution leadership (elections 2003/2005- see 
also Kyris 2012) and, most importantly, approve the Annan Plan by 65 
per cent.  
But after the EU accession of Cyprus, the internationalisation of the 
conflict has compromised the legitimacy in the eyes of the public of the 
EU and has therefore caused less pro-EU attitudes and a shift towards 
policies and elites that are inflexible vis a vis the dispute. Indeed, the 
decision to allow Greek Cypriots to enter the EU despite their rejection 
of reunification, while Turkish Cypriots who supported the Annan Plan 
remained outside, caused a lot of frustration in north Cyprus. Annoyance 
grew even bigger when the promises of the EU to develop relations with 
the Turkish Cypriots and address their isolation (see before) were not 
materialised due to Greek Cypriot objections (interview with Turkish 
Cypriot party leader 2009, interview with Turkish Cypriot official 2009). 
Consequently, the appeal of the EU amongst Turkish Cypriots, although 
still high (European Commission 2013), is constantly decreasing. In 
political matters, it has made pro-EU rhetoric and positions more costly 
and indeed parties which are eurosceptic and 'hardline' towards a 
compromised solution have increased their vote share and scored a 
comeback at the helm of the community between 2009 and 2013. 
Crucially for the Turkish Cypriot policies towards the dispute, this 
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‘hardline’ leadership has focused more on the separate existence of the 
Turkish Cypriots and the support of their self-declared administration.  
But, despite all the loss of EU appeal and slower negotiations, it seems 
that the EU continues to be a sought-after reward for the Turkish 
Cypriots who most of them view the EU in a positive light (European 
Commission 2013), also due to their ongoing international isolation 
(interview with Turkish diplomat 2013). 
All in all, the internalisation of the conflict into the EU has brought more 
inflexible Turkish and Turkish Cypriot policies towards the Cyprus issue. 
The accession of the RoC amidst the conflict has led to a decrease of EU 
appeal and legitimacy amongst the Turkish Cypriot public and has 
empowered less flexible elites and similar policies in the dispute, 
similarly to Turkey. In this sense, the accession of one side of the conflict 
despite its inflexible policies and, on the other hand, the lack of progress 
in the EU relations of those parts that displayed more reconciliation 
tactics has seriously damaged the image of the EU. This represents a 
specific difference of this study case to other examples of conflicts 
between states inside and outside the EU. At the same time, the threat 
remains clear also for Turkish Cypriots, because no resolution of the 
dispute equals no integration into the EU. As far as the clarity of the 
reward is concerned, this is compromised by the internalisation of the 
conflict, yet not as much as in the case of Turkey: the EU integration of 
the Turkish Cypriots depends only on the resolution of the Cyprus issue, 
unlike Turkey's accession, which has various other challenges to 
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overcome that are beyond the scope of this paper4.  As a result, the 
decreasing ability of the EU to promote specific changes of policies in 
absence of clear rewards and threats is suggestive of the importance of 
conditionality's credibility for the process of Europeanisation, especially 
in sensitive matters like conflict resolution. This is indeed a striking 
contrast to earlier years, marked by widespread pro-EU attitudes in both 
north Cyprus and Turkey.  
5. Conclusion 
Before accession, the reward of EU integration combined with a credible 
conditionality led Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to support 
reunification, as the only way to progress in their European path. 
Nevertheless, the EU did not manage a credible conditionality for the 
Greek Cypriot side because support of reunification was never an explicit 
condition for admitting the RoC into the EU. As a result, Greek Cypriots 
remained with no motive to change their policy and, after their rejection 
of the Annan Plan, Cyprus entered the EU pending the resolution of the 
dispute.  
This ‘internalisation’ of the conflict has fundamentally changed the 
dynamics of the dispute's Europeanisation. EU membership has offered 
Greek Cypriots the change to promote their interests in the conflict5, 
through EU decision making. This Greek Cypriot strategy but also their 
                                                 
4
 According to Turkish diplomat (interview 2013), Cyprus represent s a 'virtual' problem for Turkey's 
accession, in compare to more 'real problems', like reservations of EU member states that relate to 
cultural differences between the two sides or the acccession of such a large country.  
5
 In more recent years, there are signs that Greek Cypriots try uploading their preferences at the EU 
level in a more constructive way, in order to stop accusations of being an 'one-issue' country 
(interview with Greek Cypriot diplomat 2013) but they still manage to keep a very strict conditionality 
as far as the conflict is concerned. 
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accession into the EU despite rejection of reunification has reduced the 
public appeal of the EU in north Cyprus and Turkey, where leadership 
has drawn on the EU's limited legitimacy to act as a neutral actor to 
secure gains through less compromising position and justify 
incompliance with conditionality. Interestingly, this Greek Cypriot 
'uploading' of preferences has increased the clarity of the threat, and 
therefore credibility of conditionality, for those outside the EU: it is now 
very clear that, without normalisation of relations with the member 
state RoC, Turkey won't be accepted into the EU and this is something 
acknowledged by Turkish officials (interview with Turkish diplomat 
2013)- the same goes for the Turkish Cypriots. But, other factors work 
count-productively to a credible conditionality: the clarity of EU reward 
is compromised for Turkey because the internalisation of the conflict 
and the EU membership of Greek Cypriots has caused a loss of 
momentum in its relations to the EU. Similarly, slow-paced negotiations 
on the Cyprus issue after accession make EU integration a more distant 
reality for Turkish Cypriots too.  
In tune with previous Europeanisation observations, Cyprus testifies to 
the power that the combination of conditionality and the reward of EU 
membership has in triggering changes in policies towards disputes: it is 
through clear rewards and convincing threats (e.g. Turkey, Turkish 
Cypriots before accession) that the EU can impact policies towards 
conformity with conditionality in the dispute. Where conditionality is 
softer (e.g. Greek Cypriots), the EU has limited ability to influence policy 
towards a certain direction. In this sense, this case study shows that 
internalisation of the dispute is expected to cause deteriorations of 
relations between the sides of the conflict and overall reduce the 
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credibility of conditionality: for those within the EU, membership is 
strategically seen as a tool to push the other sides of the dispute 
towards concessions. Indeed the difference of the RoC to other member 
states is that accession took place during the dispute, thus adding to 
rationalisation of membership as a tool in promoting interests in the 
conflict. Oppossitely, the accession of one side of the dispute during the 
conflict and regardless of their inflexible policies allows those outside 
the EU to attack the legitimacy of the EU and try secure more gains in 
the conflict, which means less compromising policies and compliance 
with conditionality. Besides, it is expected that the internalisation of the 
conflict will lead to a loss of EU appeal amongst the public in those 
outside the EU, which could make flexible policies more costly, while less 
clarity of rewards also offers fewer incentives for compliance with 
conditionality. Yet, and perhaps in the longer term, the clarity of the 
threat becomes greater, exactly because the presence of one side of the 
dispute within the EU renders unimaginable the possibility of accession  
in spite of the conflict.  
In this sense, this paper introduces the EU internalisation of the conflict 
as a factor that works against compliance with conflict resolution 
conditionality and towards more friction between the evolving parties. 
The accession of only one side of the dispute while the rest of actors 
remain outside makes Cyprus a distinctive case of an 'internalised' 
conflict and adds to the Europeanisation discussion, which has so far 
focused on conflicts between candidates or between candidates and old 
EU member states. In this regard, the case of Cyprus offers crucial 
lessons for conflicts in the context of EU enlargement. For example, the 
case of Serbia and Kosovo, which both are on their path towards EU 
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integration, is very relevant here and the EU seems to draw on lessons 
from Cyprus and condition the European integration of both parts on the 
resolution of their conflict. But observations of this paper can also be 
helpful for exploring the EU's role in conflict resolution, beyond the 
policy of enlargement. For example, the EU's relations to its neighbours 
through the ENP and other more tailored instruments (like the Eastern 
partnership) come across a series of regional conflicts, such as in 
Caucasus or the Middle East. In this context, reflections on how the EU's 
relations to each part of the conflict can impact the positions towards 
the dispute become important in understanding the opportunities and 
limitations of the EU's role.  Indeed, a series of disputes that exist, can 
develop or transform within the EU, particularly in the framework of 
separatists tensions in states like Spain or indeed the UK, make the issue 
of 'internalised' conflicts a rather interesting reality of contemporary EU 
affairs. 
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